This paper explores how far experimentalist features of the EU's internal food safety governance regime are being extended to the Union's external governance of food safety. Hence, it analyses whether and how far the Union's engagement with both third countries and global institutions displays features of experimentalism. Our analysis shows that while the EU constitutes a powerful global standard setter in the field of food safety, its unilateral role is to some extent mitigated by both its cooperative engagement with third countries at the bilateral level and by its embeddedness within multilateral global governance institutions, such as the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Furthermore, our analysis of two crucial institutional mechanisms of EU's external food safety governance, namely the EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) and the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) shows that both are designed, and often function well as reflexive institutions with strong features of de-centralised implementation, reporting and peer review, as well as learning and recursive revision of rules. Both FVO and RASFF provide important opportunities for third countries to participate in the Union's internal governance and rule-making processes. However, reviewing the performance of both institutions in previous food crisis situations, the analysis also reveals some important shortcomings in their practical functioning as experimentalist tools, which calls for the further improvement of these mechanisms.
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Introduction
Analysis of the EU's internal governance of food safety through the lenses of experimentalist governance revealed that this domain incorporates several characteristics of experimentalism (Vos 2010) . In this highly harmonised domain that has been subject to EU intervention since the 1960s we observed a new phenomenon whereby substantial responsibilities are devolved to a variety of actors, foremost the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), national authorities and stakeholders, at both a scientific and political level. Thereby recursive learning processes of provisional goal-setting and revision through feedback from practical experiences play an important role. In this way, we observed that the broad framework set by the General Food Law is implemented in a decentralised way by a variety of lower-level actors through deliberative mechanisms, such as networking activities, exchange of information and knowledge, reporting on activities carried out, monitoring and installation of peer review mechanisms. These mechanisms in turn provide opportunities for learning through the recursive revision of EU legislation in the light of implementation experience at national and local level. Important examples of such deliberative and recursive learning mechanisms are the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) as well as the EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) by means of its annual reports that contribute to the EU's policy-making on food safety (Vos 2010) . This paper seeeks to assess whether and how far the EU also adopts an experimental approach in its external governance of food safety. To this end, we will examine whether and how far EU governance of food safety displays experimentalist features in relation to both third countries (TCs) and global institutions (Sabel & Zeitlin 2008; . In our analysis we will focus on the balance between unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral channels for the external projection of EU food safety governance, examining how far the EU's role as a unilateral global food safety standard-setter is mitigated by its participation in both bilateral and multilateral governance initiatives. Subsequently, we will analyse two specific institutional mechanisms, which play a crucial role in EU's external food safety governance by overseeing and enforcing the EU system of import safety vis-à-vis TCs, namely the FVO (section 3) and the RASFF (section 4). Here we will mainly examine the experimentalist nature of these mechanisms, i.e. the opportunities that they provide for TCs to participate in EU's internal governance and rule-making processes thereby inducing learning and revision of rules within the EU. It is however first necessary to analyze the role of the EU as an external actor in transnational food regulation (section 2). The main question that we will address, therefore, is how and through what institutional channels and mechanisms does the EU seek to extend both its rules and its governance processes in the area of food safety beyond its borders.
And most importantly, can we identify experimentalist features in these external governance processes?
The European system of import safety in the context of global governance
As in many European policy areas, the shaping of EU external food safety policy follows the dual rationale of promoting the safety of foods traded on the internal market on the one hand and defending the interests of EU economic actors on the other. With regard to the first objective, the EU is under a constitutional obligation 1 to protect the health and safety of EU citizens vis-à-vis TC imports of food in view of the fact that the EU internal and world markets are increasingly permeable. At the same time, there seems to also be a genuine concern of the EU for food safety worldwide where it prohibits exporting foods and feeds that are unsafe. 2 The externalisation of food safety requirements is surely also beneficial for EU economic actors entering non-EU markets. comparative disadvantage arising for EU companies bound by strict health and environmental standards when they compete with foreign companies (Laïdi 2008) .
Analysis of EU's transnational food safety activities reveals that while the Union constitutes a powerful global standard setter in this field (section 2.1.), its unilateral role is to some extent mitigated by the cooperative engagement with TCs on the one hand (section 2.2.), and the EU's embeddedness within multilateral global governance institutions on the other hand (section 2.3.).
The EU as an exporter of food safety standards…
First the EU actively promotes the export of its food safety standards to TCs. This supports its characterisation as a unilateral agenda setter (Sabel & Zeitlin 2011) in this policy field. In other words the EU seeks to extend its internal standards (both procedural and substantive) beyond its borders as a condition for market access for
TCs. 3 Hence, the EU has been characterised as a "normative empire" that is able to extend its regulatory requirements to TCs based on the combination of two decisive factors: 1) the strength and attractiveness of the EU internal market for foreign companies and 2) the stringency of the EU health and safety standards, which makes importing countries adjust their regulations in order to reach the Union's level of protection (Laïdi 2008 ).
The extraterritorial effect of EU food safety standards is embedded in the legislative framework governing the European system of import controls on food products, which we will refer to as the European system of food import safety. The most important elements of this framework are the General Food Law Regulation (GFL) 4 and the Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation (OFFC). 5 The GFL provides that food and feed imported into the EU must comply with EU requirements, conditions that are recognised by the EU to be at least equivalent thereto or requirements laid down in specific agreements concluded by the EU and the exporting country. 6 The OFFC establishes a general framework for official controls carried out by both pre-export checks carried out by TC competent authorities, and the recognition that certain commodities may require specific controls prior to their introduction into EU territory. Moreover, it lays down specific Commission duties concerning the collection of relevant information from trading partners as well as the performance of inspections in TCs.
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In implementing these legal provisions, the EU adopts a so-called risk-based approach to import controls of food products. Import controls are not uniform across sectors, but are based on an assessment of the risks that specific imports pose to human, animal, and plant health -the higher the risk, the stricter the conditions for their entry into the EU, and the greater the level of controls. 9 Although this approach ensures that EU regulators can be flexible in adjusting the stringency of import requirements to both the actual risk level of every product category and the safety conditions of different importing countries, it also creates challenges for the effectiveness of EU surveillance and law enforcement capacities. Not only do market surveillance and law enforcement authorities both at EU and national level need to be able to detect new food safety risks in a timely manner, but a constant and timely flow of information also needs to be ensured between border control points, European and TC competent authorities and inspectors, health and food safety experts, private business operators, and other actors involved. Noteworthy is that the vast majority of TC imported goods in the EU are not subject to systematic border controls, which would be practically unfeasible given the volume of incoming goods.
Most imported goods therefore circulate freely on the EU internal market once they have fulfilled formal customs requirements (Alemanno 2009) . It is therefore clear that the implementation of this multi-level and multi-actor regulatory framework, which is regularly reviewed and revised in the light of new risk assessments and safety incidents, depends on an effective cooperation with TC authorities to ensure food safety within the EU.
…in a collaborative setting
The export of EU rules to TCs is therefore not only a matter of unilateral adjustment by the importing countries, but is actively promoted by the EU institutions. (Rakpong 2011; Jaffee & Henson 2004) .
Secondly, EU officials visit the TC, and carry out official controls on its territory in order to verify the compliance or equivalence of that country's legislation and systems with EU food safety requirements. 14 The FVO is an important actor in this regard. Studies reveal that when carrying out its control missions in TCs, the FVO tends to actively engage in a dialogue with the national and local authorities and exporting businesses (Lawless 2010 , Rakpong 2011 Codex and other international standards, they can be seen as the result of joint decision-making in global multilateral fora. TCs subject to those rules as importers into the EU have, at least in principle, participated in their setting at global level.
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The increasing importance of international standards in EU food safety regulation results from WTO law. According to the SPS and TBT Agreements, the EU is obliged to base its food safety regulations on existing international standards (Scott 2009 , Howse 2011 . 28 In this way, WTO law would provide a presumptive "safe harbour" for Member States against challenges to domestic regulations adopted on the basis of international standards. Any deviation resulting in a higher level of protection than that achieved under the relevant international standard needs to be scientifically advancing the EU preferred risk assessment approach within the Codex, EFSA also defines its task as "to be able to contribute to and to learn from international risk assessments activities and be fully embedded in the international scientific community." 32 Therefore, EFSA as a networked agency seems to play an important role not only within EU's internal governance of food safety (Vos 2010) , but also in the external dimension connecting EU scientific experts and authorities with actors at global level.
Experimentalist features
Our analysis showed that the Union's role in transnational regulation of food safety vis-à-vis TCs can only be properly understood when viewed within the larger context of global governance. On the one hand, due to the economic attractiveness of its internal market and the strictness of its food safety rules the EU appears to be a powerful global standard-setter triggering processes of regulatory adjustment in TCs.
This presents a challenge especially for developing countries seeing the high costs of compliance with EU safety requirements, and the often lacking technical and financial capacities in the developing world. On the other hand, it has also been shown that simply viewing the EU as a unilateral setter of import safety rules does not do justice to its involvement in multilateral governance institutions at the global level. Above all, WTO law and international standards, such as Codex standards, can, in principle, be seen as mechanisms of holding EU decision-makers to account for the external effects of the Union's standards on other, especially developing, countries.
In experimentalist terms, these global governance institutions have the potential to destabilise EU's internal decision processes by subjecting them to certain deliberative constraints. Moreover, with the increasing use of international standards as the basis for EU food safety regulation, global governance is transforming the nature of the EU as a unilateral standard-setter in this area. Bearing in mind the first characteristic of experimentalist governance, namely framework rulemaking, it follows that EU import safety rules exported to TCs as a condition for market access can be considered as, to some extent, the result of joint governance within global multilateral fora. governance, namely discretion in the local implementation of rules, peer review, and recursive revision, it has been shown that rather than simply imposing EU standards on importing countries, the EU has developed several mechanisms of both cooperation with and capacity-building support for TCs in meeting its import safety requirements. In some cases, such as with the competent authority model, TC authorities are even acting as de facto agents of EU food safety regulation, which in turn allows them to communicate their needs and concerns back into the EU regulatory process.
The role of the EU Food and Veterinary Office in external governance of food safety

Role and tasks
The EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) plays a crucial role in ensuring the functioning of the EU risk-based food import safety system, as set forth above. The FVO is a service within the Commission's Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO). Its task is to ensure that Union legislation on food safety, animal health, plant health and animal welfare is properly implemented and enforced.
It also undertakes market surveillance in these areas. The latter task is founded in the OFFC that lays down a number of rules for the performance of amongst other EU controls in the Member States and in TCs. 33 2) contribute to the development of European Community policy in the food safety, animal health and welfare and plant health sectors;
3) contribute to the development and implementation of effective control systems in the food safety, animal health and welfare and plant health sectors; and 4) inform stakeholders of the outcome of its audits and inspections.
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Rather uniquely, the FVO acts as an auditor of national law enforcement capacity.
According to the Commission, by carrying out a programme of audits and inspections the FVO ensures that control systems at national level are effective. It evaluates the performance of national authorities against their ability to deliver and operate effective control systems, and undertakes visits to individual premises to verify that acceptable standards are actually being met. 36 The FVO, therefore, can be considered as the "eyes and ears" of the Commission.
The establishment and structure of the FVO goes back to the political and legal restructuring of the EU food safety system following the BSE crisis and the recommendations made by the Medina Ortega report. One of the aspects criticised by the latter was the quality and coordination of national and EU veterinary inspections during the BSE crisis. Amongst other things, the report stressed the need to ensure a better coordination between inspection and law-making in the EU:
"Any future structure should ensure the closest possible coordination between the legislative authorities and the bodies responsible for monitoring and verifying the practical application or otherwise of the rules. The inspectorate should act to follow up all legislation, and, conversely, the results of the inspections should be subject to constant scrutiny by the legislative and executive bodies." In the aftermath of the BSE crisis independence of the EU audit system was regarded to be crucial. However, it was considered that independence could be achieved "through the establishment of a clearly defined legal and official status of the control services, covering their mission, the functions, and responsibilities of personnel, the procedures, the working practices etc" 40 while maintaining the services under the organisational structure of the Commission (Lawless 2010) . The location of the FVO is in Grange, Ireland, which emphasises its exceptional status as an independent body within the Commission. While the FVO does not enjoy powers to take formal action against Member States or TCs for breach of EU food safety law, its mission reports form an important evidentiary basis for any actions taken by the Commission in situations in which the application of EU food safety law both at national level and within TCs is found to be unsatisfactory.
The experimentalist features of FVO's missions in Third Countries
When carrying out missions in TCs the FVO operates within the type of complex, diverse and strategically uncertain regulatory environment, which is seen as favourable to the emergence of experimentalist governance (Sabel & Zeitlin 2011 ).
Firstly, regulatory and production conditions vary considerably among importing countries, often requiring different means to achieving the objective of EU food import safety. Secondly, monitoring and compliance with EU rules is more difficult to achieve by traditional command-and-control approaches based on the direct control by the FVO of individual food production establishments in TCs approved for export to the EU (Lawless 2010) . These insights have led to the introduction of a new "systems approach" under the Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation, which is strongly related to the concept of an "audit" as defined under this regulation.
According to this approach the focus of FVO missions is no longer on the inspection of individual exporting establishments -although this remains part of FVO's workbut rather on the effectiveness of TC regulatory systems as a whole. Thus, when auditing control systems at national level the FVO undertakes a systematic examination "whether activities and related results comply with planned arrangements and whether these arrangements are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives. "As a consequence the current approach does necessarily require much more attention to the individual effectiveness of the regulatory system of a Third Country and, as a consequence, openness to learning about all the relevant circumstances in a given jurisdiction which are relevant to its operation." (Lawless 2010) The way the FVO operates when auditing TCs, in fact, displays several features of cooperative and reflexive governance, which aims at enhancing the control capacity on both sides of the EU-TC relationship. The process starts with the annual development of the FVO programme for audits, which identifies priority areas and countries to be visited (both within and outside the EU). This programme is published on the FVO website, and reviewed mid-year in order to keep it up to date to recent developments, such as food safety incidents. When identifying audit priorities, the FVO considers factors such as risk, legal requirements, trade and policy considerations, with risk being the main factor.
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In preparation of each mission, the FVO agrees in a consensual way on the itinerary of the mission with the national authorities of the audited country. 43 The priorities of each mission are being set considering the so-called country profiles developed and updated by an internal FVO unit. Country profiles ensure that an overall profile of each country visited is being maintained and updated, collating the findings of different general and specific missions over time. In addition,, when planning the mission the FVO also distributes so-called pre-mission questionnaires in order to obtain more information on regulation and the agri-food structure of the TCs.
Upon arrival in the TC the FVO team continues to closely cooperate with the national officials through personal meetings and the discussion of outstanding issues.
Together, FVO and TC officials visit exporting establishments, such as production sites and farms. Lawless reports that problematic issues are noted and raised with TC officials during the course of the mission; and they are again raised at a close-out meeting with the TC authorities at the end of the FVO visit (Lawless 2010) . guaranteeing that where these products are exported to the EU, they comply with the relevant EU food safety regulations, for which they issue the relevant export certificates that give presumed equivalency status under EU law, and reduce the frequency of full EU border checks thus accelerating access to the EU market (Rakpong 2011: 92, 127, 149) .
Both prior to and after conferring the competent authority status, the FVO was responsible for checking the competency of the Thai authorities in question. The FVO reports have served as guidance for them in addressing areas of food safety concern indicating what has to be done in order to maintain the competent authority status. As a result, FVO recommendations have led to major reforms in the Thai food safety regulatory system and institutional structures. At the same time, Thai competent authorities have used FVO missions to communicate back to the EU, to attest their willingness to comply with the recommendations and issues raised, and to raise any concerns regarding the impracticality of the recommendations or the time frame for compliance (Rakpong 2011: 129-130 ).
The study also shows positive spill over effects following the introduction of the competent authority model for Thailand's regulatory and law enforcement capacity to respond to food safety incidents. This model has served as a "due-diligence defence"
assisting Thai authorities in sustaining claims to limit the scope of EU import bans in case of certain incidents, such as for example during the 2007 "Shigella" outbreaks in Thai baby corn. By taking quick and effective crisis management measures Thai authorities were able to convince the EU Commission and FVO that the crisis situation was controlled, which in turn led the EU to take a more lenient approach and to refrain from imposing an outright ban on all baby corn from Thailand (Rakpong 2011: 149-155 ).
The second example relates to a series of FVO inspections concerning pesticide controls in food of plant origin intended for export to the EU that were carried out in In its recommendations addressed to national competent authorities in the audited countries the FVO suggested an improvement in the national official controls systems with regard to EU MRLs, including better provision of information to farmers, better inspections, sampling of products for export, better evaluation of laboratories, and the broadening of scope of analyses in the pesticide residues laboratories. 47 It is noteworthy that the FVO also recommended following the sampling procedure for pesticide residues in line with the respective Codex Guidelines CAC/GL 33- 
Functioning of the RASFF
Source: RASFF annual report 2011
From the figure above it becomes clear that TCs play an important rule in the functioning of RASFF. Yet not only is RASFF in this way developing a transnational dimension, it also serves as a governance model for developing rapid alert systems in other world regions, and at international level.
Export of the RASFF governance model to the global level
According to the Commission the RASFF has entered a new worldwide phase and is being perceived as a successful governance model to be exported to other regional organisations, and even as a model for a global Rapid Alert System. 
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According to Alemanno (2010: 214) , the EU is currently focusing its efforts on extending its reactive 'safety-net' regulatory model including the RASFF beyond its borders, "thus inevitably giving rise to an interesting legal export of its own approach to import safety".
Another With regard to the first feature, namely joint rule-setting, 73 the observations made with regard to the experimentalist nature of the FVO 74 also apply here. As long as RASFF serves to enforce extraterritorially food safety rules set by the EU in a unilateral fashion, it appears to support the export of EU standards to TCs rather than being truly experimentalist. However, as shown above, 75 the setting of EU food safety standards is subject to the reflexive discipline of WTO law on the one hand, and is often based on standards set within multilateral regimes at global level (eg Codex) on the other. This multilateral, rather than unilateral nature of EU standards is reflected in RASFF's work, namely where the network is used to monitor compliance of imported products with international standards as incorporated in EU legislation.
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Other experimentalist features, such as the active input of TCs as local units, reporting, peer review and recursive rule-making are clearly present in RASFF. To begin with, hierarchy is absent within the latter, and all RASFF contact points, including those in TCs, participate in the information exchange as equal partners.
TCs are both recipients and transmitters of relevant information within RASFF. As will be shown below, a RASFF notification concerning a problem with an imported product or a product exported to a TC triggers processes of cooperation, mutual consultation, reporting, and monitoring of progress between EU and TC authorities and other relevant actors, such as business operators. The data collected through Interestingly, at first the EU applied maximum levels for the pre-export checks of radioactivity, which were established by EU legislation. 78 However, for reasons of providing consistency between pre-export controls performed by the Japanese authorities and the controls on feed and food from Japan at import, the Commission decided in April 2011 to apply the stricter maximum levels already applied in Japan.
This is a clear example of adaptation of EU standards in view of regulatory practices in a TC.
The original emergency measure was subsequently reviewed and updated on a regular basis to take account of the development of the situation. According to the Commission in the overall management of the crisis situation RASFF has proven to be indispensable to ensure an effective and rapid communication with the Member
States and Japan concerning the development of the situation, the measures to be taken, and the sharing of control results. 
Shortcomings in the functioning of RASFF: the case of the E-Coli outbreak
There are, however, other examples presenting a more differentiated picture of RASFF as an experimentalist mechanism. On the one hand, especially in bigger food crisis situations, RASFF often in combination with FVO missions to TCs clearly manages to uncover weaknesses of the existing EU food safety system allowing both EU and TC regulators to draw lessons, and to adjust their systems in view of new knowledge and experience. On the other hand, however, both RASFF's functioning and the learning processes induced are not always successful in practice.
The dramatic food contamination following the E-coli (Shiga toxin-producing It seems therefore that a major problem of risk communication during the E-coli outbreak was that wrong or unverified information was communicated by the Hamburg authorities through RASFF too quickly, without prior validation by the formal German federal RASFF contact point (BfR). This is related to a more general problem with regard to RASFF's operation, namely the question whether or not unverified information can be communicated through it. 93 The RASFF implementing 92 See ibid., p. 8. 93 According to the RASFF implementing regulation 16/2011 "the fact that not all relevant information has been collected shall not unduly delay transmission of alert notifications."
Conclusions
This chapter has examined whether and how far EU external governance of food safety in relation to TCs and global institutions displays an experimentalist architecture comparable to that previously identified in the Union's internal food safety governance system (Vos 2010) . Overall, significant potential for experimentalism has been identified in the functioning of EU's food import safety system in general and in the operation of its institutional mechanisms, such as the FVO and RASFF, in particular.
Thus the role of the EU as an external actor of transnational food regulation needs to be differentiated. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the EU constitutes a "normative empire," i.e. a powerful unilateral global standard-setter in the area of food safety, because it is able to extend its regulatory requirements to TCs as a condition for their market access. This is especially problematic in the case of developing countries, for which EU food safety standards can become de facto trade barriers. On the other hand, European decision-makers seem to be aware of their role (and responsibility) in this regard. Not only is there a legal obligation in the EU to consider the impact of its food regulation on developing countries, but the Union has also developed several governance mechanisms to build the technical and financial capacity of developing countries exporting to it.
Moreover, our analysis has shown that the EU system of food import safety needs to be seen in the context of global food safety governance institutions, such as the WTO, and international standards setting bodies, such as the Codex Alimentarius
Commission. These global institutions can be seen as mechanisms for holding EU decision-makers to account for the external effects of EU standards on other, especially developing, countries. In experimentalist terms, these institutions have the potential to destabilize EU's internal decision processes by subjecting them to certain deliberative constraints. Moreover, with the increasing use of international standards as the basis for EU food safety regulation, global governance is transforming the nature of the EU as a unilateral standard-setter in this area.
It follows that EU food safety rules exported to TCs as a condition for market access can be considered to some extent as the result of joint rule-setting within global multilateral fora. Furthermore, rather than simply imposing EU standards on importing countries, the EU has developed several mechanisms of both co-operation with and capacity-building support for TCs in meeting the EU import safety requirements. In some cases, such as with the competent authority model, TC authorities may even act as de facto agents of EU food safety regulation, which in turn allows them to communicate their needs and concerns back into the Union's regulatory process.
However, it should be stressed that the extent to which experimentalism actually takes place in EU external governance of food safety may vary depending on the specific context and relationship with the TC. While the present study demonstrated the potential of this complex system to foster experimentalism, we also see a need for more detailed empirical research to examine specific cases of EU-TCs interactions in this area, as well as the functioning of WTO governance and international standard-setting from an experimentalist perspective. Notably, the extent to which global governance institutions are able to foster the development of experimentalism in the EU is likely to depend on the realization of further conditions. Closer analysis of FVO missions in TCs has shown that the latter formulates its recommendations under the active participation of the national authorities of the audited country, which in turn autonomously develops a plan of how to implement these recommendations. This process is being constantly monitored. Follow-up action includes subsequent reviews, recommendations, and monitoring of implementation. Especially when operating within the competent authority model in TCs, the FVO makes part of networked transnational governance, in which EU and TC authorities cooperate. The reported examples show that this system not only relies on the capability of both sides to learn from each other, but also triggers processes of adaptation and revision of rules on both sides. Surely, the onus of adaptation is more on the importing TC, especially in the case of economically weaker export dependent countries. What is interesting, however, is that the FVO's engagement with these countries is likely to trigger a process of EU support and capacity building, which in turn increases the chances of the TC to make its voice heard in the EU decision-making process on import conditions relevant to it.
However, in practice some problems exist with regard to the effective coordination between the FVO and the Member States in the area of meat import controls; a lack of coordination between RASFF notifications and FVO's annual audit planning; and difficulties of the FVO to effectively induce change and regulatory improvement within the EU Member States. While these findings mostly concern the internal functioning of the EU official controls system, they do affect the overall functioning of the EU system of import safety, which is based on an effective cooperation and exchange of information between the EU and the Member States. Moreover, this raises the question to what extent similar problems could also occur in FVO's cooperation with TCs.
Our analysis of RASFF has demonstrated that today it can be considered a At the same time our analysis of RASFF's functioning during the E-Coli outbreak has indicated problems of reflexivity and institutional learning. It seems that a major problem of risk communication during the E-coli outbreak was that wrong or unverified information was communicated through RASFF too quickly and without prior validation by the German federal RASFF contact point (BfR). This is related to a more general problem with regard to RASFF's operation, namely the question whether or not unverified or uncertain information can be communicated through the network. Although this question was already raised in previous EU food safety crises, for example during the 2008 Irish pork dioxin contamination, it is not directly addressed in the current reflection on the regulatory problems during the E-coli outbreak at EU level, nor at national level. This is surely something that needs to be done in the future.
In sum we conclude that there is a strong potential for the extension of the experimentalist features of EU food safety governance both transnationally and to the global governance of food safety. Whether this potential is fully realised in practice seems to depend on the precise relationship of the Union with individual TCs, and its willingness to address the shortcomings we revealed in the FVO and RASFF systems, as well as on the successful functioning of WTO governance and international standard-setting as diffusion mechanisms of experimentalism. This requires further, in-depth research.
